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Investments in Land Conservation in the Ethiopian Highlands:  
A Household Plot-Level Analysis of the Roles of Poverty,  
Tenure Security, and Market Inventives 
Genanew Bekele and Alemu Mekonnen 
Abstract 
Land degradation is a major problem undermining land productivity in the highlands of 
Ethiopia. This study explores the factors that affect farm households’ decisions at the plot level to invest 
in land conservation and how much to invest, focusing on the roles of poverty, land tenure security, and 
market access. Unlike most other studies, we used a double-hurdle model in the analysis with panel data 
collected in a household survey of 6,408 plots in the Amhara region of Ethiopia. The results suggest that 
the decisions to adopt land conservation investment and how much to invest appear to be explained by 
different processes. Poverty-related factors seem to have a mixed effect on both the adoption and 
intensity decisions. While a farmer’s adoption decision is influenced by whether or not the plot is 
owner-operated (a measure of risk for the immediate period), intensity of conservation is determined by 
expectation of the certainty of cultivating the land for the next five years (a measure of risk for the 
longer term), farmer’s belief of land ownership, and distance from plot to home.  
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Investments in Land Conservation in the Ethiopian Highlands:  
A Household Plot-Level Analysis of the Roles of Poverty,  
Tenure Security, and Market Inventives 
Genanew Bekele and Alemu Mekonnen∗ 
Introduction 
A critical environmental issue facing governments of developing societies is land 
degradation, which is crucial to, among other things, the well-being of their people. Hurni (1985) 
noted well over 20 years ago that Ethiopia was the most environmentally troubled country in the 
Sahel belt. Studies of land degradation in Ethiopia have confirmed that it undermines agricultural 
productivity primarily in the highlands, where most (88%) of the country’s population lives, and 
accounts for more than 43 percent of the country’s area, 95% of the cultivated land, and 75% of 
the livestock. Estimates of the extent of land degradation differ, but all indicate the importance of 
the problem. The Ethiopian Highland Reclamation Study (EHRS) estimated that by the mid-
1980s about 50% of the highlands (27 million hectares) were significantly eroded, while more 
than one-fourth was seriously eroded (EHRS 1986, cited in Gebremedhin and Swinton 2003). 
Hurni (1988) found that soil loss in cultivated areas averaged about 42 metric tons per hectare 
per year, far exceeding the soil formation rate of 3–7 metric tons per hectare per year. Stahl 
(1990) estimated that the amount of land incapable of supporting cultivation would reach 10 
million hectares by the year 2010.  
The magnitude of land degradation (and deforestation) by far exceeds the conservation 
activities being carried out.1 Indeed, it is only recently that public intervention in land 
conservation has become an important priority in Ethiopia. Land degradation was largely 
neglected by policymakers until the 1970s and national conservation programs introduced since 
then have been guided by little prior research (Shiferaw and Holden 1999). Policies and 
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1 Gebremedhin and Swinton (2003), for instance, showed that land conservation structures were less than the 
average requirement of 700 meters per hectare of stone terraces or soil bunds to conserve one hectare of land and 
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programs were adopted based on incorrect assumptions and little understanding of the incentives 
and constraints related to land conservation—which could be misleading and may even have 
exacerbated the degradation process.  
Better knowledge about what criteria households use in their decisions to invest in land 
conservation and how these criteria are used will improve policymakers’ ability to design 
effective programs that promote such land conservation investments. This study looks into 
factors affecting farm households’ decisions to invest in land conservation and how much to 
invest by focusing on the roles of poverty-related factors, land tenure security, and market 
access.  
The effects of these sets of variables on a land conservation decision and level of 
conservation are not clear from the literature. For example, an inverse relationship between 
poverty (in its different forms) and a household’s decision to invest in land conservation and at 
what intensity is substantiated in various studies (see, e.g., Hagos and Holden 2006; 
Gebremedhin and Swinton 2003; Clay et al. 2002; Holden and Shiferaw 2002; Holden et al. 
1998; Godoy et al. 2001). On the other hand, it is also argued in the literature that risk aversion 
may enhance technology adoption if the technology reduces the risk to household income, 
suggesting the possibility that poverty may positively influence land conservation investment. 
Similarly, there are studies that found or argued that more secure land tenure encourages land 
conservation investment (Feder et al. 1988; Alemu 1999; Gebremedhin and Swinton 2003; 
Joireman 2001; Rahmato 1992), while others found either weak or unclear effects of land tenure 
security on land conservation investment (Sjaastad and Bromley 1997; Place and Migot-Adholla 
1998; Brasselle et al. 2002, and Holden and Yohannes 2002). 
This study makes a number of contributions to the existing literature on land 
conservation. We used household plot-level panel data collected in household surveys in the 
years 2000, 2002, and 2005 from the Amhara region of Ethiopia. Unlike most other studies that 
have analyzed land conservation, the use of panel data enabled us to use lagged values of some 
of the explanatory variables, which helped resolve issues of endogeneity (among others). At the 
same time, it gave us the chance to consider the effect of past values of variables on current 
decisions. The richness of the data on land conservation lets us analyze not only the determinants 
of adoption but also the level of investment in land conservation. Moreover, unlike most other Environment for Development  Bekele and Mekonnen 
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studies,2 and partly because of the availability of data on the level of investment, we also used 
Cragg’s (1971) double-hurdle model in our analysis, which helps identify whether the 
determinants of adoption are different from those of the level of investment in land conservation 
Finally, compared with other studies on the topic, we incorporated a wider range of variables, 
including asset- and poverty-related factors as possible determinants of the decision to adopt and 
intensify land conservation investment.  
We found that the decision to adopt land conservation investment and the decision about 
how much to invest appear to be explained by different processes. Poverty-related factors seem 
to have a mixed effect on adoption as well as intensity decisions. While a farmer’s adoption 
decision is influenced by whether or not the plot is owner-operated, the intensity of conservation 
is determined by expectation of the certainty that the farmer will cultivate the plot for a longer 
period,3 farmer’s belief of land ownership, and plot-home distance. Our results amplified the 
gender-specific nature of labor division in Ethiopia, suggesting that female labor availability 
represents a different asset type and is more important in intensifying land conservation 
investment. While access to extension services (which is often focused on general issues related 
to agriculture) affects adoption, access to advice on soil conservation affects intensity. 
Furthermore, our results show a preference of farm households to invest first and foremost in 
plots that are not well-conserved or plots with limited or no previous conservation structures. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The conceptual framework we use is 
presented in section 1. Section 2 presents the empirical strategy we follow. Data, results, and 
interpretation are presented in section 3, while section 4 summarizes and concludes.  
1. Conceptual Framework  
A farm household’s expenditure on land conservation practices and input uses can 
consume a significant share of its overall expenditure. Land conservation and input uses, thus, 
imply that the household foregoes other consumption and/or investment opportunities, at least 
temporarily. Use of land conservation practices and inputs, therefore, are considered to be major 
investment decisions by farmers. For Clay et al. (2002), farmers are likely to pose two basic 
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questions before making land conservation investment and/or using land inputs:  1) will 
investment in land conservation and/or input use be profitable, and 2) can they afford it? Thus, 
factors that influence profitability can be thought of as the “incentives” (including financial and 
physical) to adopt land conservation practice and input uses. On the other hand, whether farmers 
can afford to invest in land conservation depends on their capacity to carry out the land 
conservation investment.  
Ideally, financial or monetary incentive factors that affect profitability of investment in 
conservation practices and inputs include access to market, crop and input prices, cost of labor 
and materials used for conservation, prevailing wages for agricultural and non-agricultural 
activities, and yield effect of land conservation practices (see, e.g., Gebremedhin and Swinton 
2003; Clay et al. 2002.) In relation to access to market, output prices are expected to affect land 
investment through the incentive they can create to plant soil-conserving crops (e.g., perennials, 
such as coffee and bananas) versus more erosive crops (such as cereals and beans). We used site 
dummies to account for differences in prices across sites in this study. Moreover, in cases where 
much of the production is consumed by the household (a common situation in rural Ethiopia), we 
can assume (in our model) that farmers use criteria other than market prices to evaluate returns 
from land conservation and input investments. We can, therefore, model household conservation 
investment under imperfect factor markets because markets in developing countries (such as in 
our study sites) can often be missing, thin, or imperfect (Holden et al. 2001; Udry 1996). This 
implies that households’ production and investment decisions may not be dictated by profit 
considerations alone, but consumption choices as well.  
In such settings where markets do not fully function or are entirely missing, other factors, 
such as household poverty-related characteristics (including asset, wealth, and endowments) and 
land tenure security, can play a critical role in influencing the decision and intensity of land 
conservation investments. Physical incentive factors can also affect profitability of investment in 
land conservation practices and inputs. (These include farm and plot characteristics, such as plot 
size, altitude, fragmentation, slope, fertility, irrigation access, and distance from plot to home.) A 
farm household’s capacity to carry out land conservation practices and inputs improves as the 
farmer gets richer, when financial capital increases and when levels of human and social capital 
are higher. Financial capital, which includes cash income and/or credit, and non-liquid assets, 
permits farmers to invest more, while human capital, such as education and labor input, enables 
farmers to use land conservation more efficiently. Such capacity factors are broadly called 
wealth (and in this study are referred as poverty-related factors) and constitute a major 
determinant of investments in land conservation and input uses.  Environment for Development  Bekele and Mekonnen 
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Farmers also consider the risk of making land conservation investments and input uses, 
and this risk can alter their capacity to invest in land conservation practices and input uses. If, for 
instance, farmers are uncertain of recovering the full benefits of their investment in the land, then 
land investment will become riskier and incentives will wane. For Feder et al. (1985), these risks 
fell into two categories:  risks affecting “confidence in the short term,” (such as from price or 
rainfall instability)4 and risks affecting “confidence in the long term” (such as insecure land 
tenure). This study focuses on the latter. The effect of farmers’ risk associated with insecure land 
tenure on their decision to make land conservation investment is relevant in Ethiopia where land 
is state-owned and the farmer has only right of use.  
Swinton and Quiroz (2003) formally modeled the question as to which factors govern a 
household’s choice to adopt and intensify a particular farming practice. For them, such a 
microeconomic decision emerged from the household’s attempt to optimize its perceived 
welfare, subject to limitations imposed by the available economic and natural resources, as well 
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This model (equation [1]) states that the farm household chooses the agricultural 
practices x that will maximize the household’s utility from consuming marketed consumption-
good c and home-produced good y in quantity y
c, subject to the technology for producing good y 
on the farm, the household budget, and the availability of labor. In terms of technology, the 
maximization is constrained by the technology for producing good y on the farm, which depends 
on agricultural labor (La) and agricultural practices (x), and is conditioned by farm-level capital 
(k, in various forms) and other natural and external economic characteristics (z).5 The budget 
                                                 
4 Volatile and unpredictable output prices can, for instance, be a source of farmers’ risk by reducing incentives; 
farmers will be uncertain of their ability to recover their investment costs by selling surplus production. 
5 Here, it is assumed that the production function y is differentiable, increasing, and concave. It is not, however, 
assumed that the production function y(.) is separable in inputs x Environment for Development  Bekele and Mekonnen 
6 
constraint states that no more of c can be purchased at price pc than the household can afford 
with net income from sales of y after subtracting home consumption (y
c), the cost of production 
practices (pxx), and the cost of hired farm labor (pahLah), plus income from non-farm employment 
(plnLn). Finally, the labor available for own-farm production work (La) must either come from the 
family (Laf) or from hired labor (Lah). And family labor may be devoted either to own-farm 
agricultural work (Laf) or to non-farm work (Ln). 
The solution to this constrained optimization problem yields a reduced form input 
demand equation (equation [2]) for farming practices xji (the specific practice xj associated with 
the state of natural resource i) that depends on the prices (p) of output y; inputs x; labor La and 
Ln; the levels of other agricultural practices x(j) other than xj; farm capital or asset (k); and 
conditioning factors (z) related to economic infrastructure, natural characteristics, and the 
household’s management knowledge and information. 
) , , , ( ) ( z k x p x x j j ji =
                             (2)    
Equation (2) seeks to answer what matters in the choice of land conservation or farming 
practices. For instance, do poverty-related factors, such as asset levels, matter in determining the 
choice of farming practices? If so, which assets matter most—land, livestock, household labor, 
human capital (education), and/or social capital?        
  Following Reardon and Vosti (1995), the categories of poverty or assets in the above 
analysis go beyond conventional accounting definition of “assets.” In this model, the definition 
of capital assets (k, which gauges poverty) measures assets as physical and financial (including 
income, land, livestock, equipment, buildings, financial assets, and other inventories with 
marketable value (such as value of live trees). On the other hand, the value of people as a 
productive asset depends on their number (as measured by household size) and their quality (as 
measured by age and education) and is a key productive resource. Moreover, social capital is 
also an additional asset category worth consideration in the model. This is because social 
capital6 may allow a community to impose social norms to discourage individual behavior that 
undermines the long-term interests of the community as a whole. Moreover, the degree to which 
                                                 
6 In Ethiopia, edir and ekub are among the indigenous social capitals that may allow a community to impose social 
norms to individual behavior. Edir is mainly associated with funerals, and ekub is a rotating saving and credit 
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people in a community care about one another may ameliorate other conventional resource 
constraints, such as market access or credit limitations. In this study, the z variable can broadly 
account for institutional settings, such as market incentives and land tenure security.  
2. Empirical Strategy 
In this section, we present a general empirical model of farm investment on land 
conservation practices set in a way that reflects the conceptual framework summarized above. 
The selection of explanatory variables we used was also based on various related empirical 
works (e.g., Clay et al. 2002; Gebremedhin and Swinton 2003; Hagos and Holden 2006; and 
Kabubo-Mariara 2007) and theoretical literature on farm-level investment (e.g., Christensen 
1989; Feder et al. 1992; and Feder et al. 1985). In view of this, investment in land conservation is 
viewed as a function of six vectors of variables (poverty-related factors, land tenure security, 
market access, physical incentives or plot characteristics, alternative land conservation practices, 
and village dummies. 
2.1 General Empirical Model 
The general form of the empirical model we used is given in equation (3): 
Ιtij   =  β0  + (Povertyt-1i)β1   +  (Tenuretij)β2   +  (Marketti)β3  + ( Plottj)β4  + (CV)β5 + ε    (3) 
where Ιtij represents the level of land conservation investment made by the farm household i on 
plot j, as measured by the length of land conservation structure per hectare over the last 12 
months (i.e., over the t-time period); β0 represents the constant term; and the vector Povertyt-1i 
includes measures of income and asset levels of the farm household i over the year prior to the 
last 12 months (i.e., over the t-1 – time period). We assumed that initial poverty-related 
constraints would matter in the farm household’s decision to invest in land conservation. Thus, 
we considered lagged values of the cash income and non-liquid asset variables. Such initial 
wealth conditions enable examination of the effect of time recursive causality of initial wealth 
characteristics on land conservation investments (see, e.g., Hagos and Holden 2006). The vector 
Tenuretij represents variables measuring degree of tenure security by the farm household i on plot 
j over the t-time period. The vector Marketti is related to market access variables associated with 
farm household i over the t-time period. The vector Plottj represents variables measuring physical 
characteristics pertinent to plot j of farm household i over the t-time period. β1, β2, β3, β4, and β5 
are each a vector of parameters corresponding to each vector of variablesj. We also included Environment for Development  Bekele and Mekonnen 
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other control variables (CV). These consist of intensity of alternative land conservation practices 
and village dummies. ε  represents the error term. 
As highlighted above, we modeled adoption and intensity of land conservation 
investment at the plot rather than at the household level. Thus, the model design takes into 
account that land conservation adoption and intensity decisions are not made uniformly for the 
entire farm of the household. Unlike most other studies that analyze land conservation, we used a 
broader set of variables needed to understand the farm management and household strategy seen 
in such investments. Due to the panel nature of the data used in this study (associated with 
multiple plot-level observations for each household or cluster of plots of a particular household), 
we attempted to correct the standard errors for clustering at the household level.  
2.2  Issues in Model Selection 
In principle, the decisions whether to adopt investment in land conservation and input 
practices, and how much to invest (level or intensity of investment), can be made jointly or 
separately. It can be argued that adoption and intensity of use decisions are not necessarily made 
jointly (see, e.g., Gebremedhin and Swinton 2003). The decision to adopt may precede the 
decision on the intensity of use, and the factors affecting each decision may be different. Had it 
been the case that the two decisions were made jointly (see Sureshwaran et al. 1996; Pender and 
Kerr 1998) and that these decisions were affected by the same set of factors, then the Tobit 
model would be appropriate for analyzing the factors affecting the joint decision (Greene 1993).  
However, neither straightforward binary nor censored data models may help in a case 
where factors affecting each decision are different because such models assume that the process 
that results in non-adoption is the same as the one that determines the intensity of adoption (see, 
e.g., Moffatt 2003). An argument can be made here that if a given farm household’s 
characteristic is known to have a positive effect on the extent of adoption, then a high value of 
this characteristic would inevitably lead to the prediction of adoption for such a farmer. There 
may be a proportion of the population of farmers who would, out of principle or because they 
will be negatively affected by adopting the land conservation practice or input, never adopt under 
any circumstances. In such a case, a model such as Tobit (see, e.g., Martinez-Espiñeira 2004) 
might be too restrictive because it allows one type of zero observation, namely a corner solution, 
since it is based on the implicit assumption that zeros arise only as a result of the respondent’s 
economic circumstances. Even the p-Tobit model (a flexible version of the Tobit model in terms 
of considering the non-supporters of land conservation) fails to analyze the factors that will make Environment for Development  Bekele and Mekonnen 
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a respondent more or less likely to be a supporter of land conservation (Martinez-Espiñeira 
2004). 
In the case where the decision whether to adopt the land conservation investment and the 
decision about how much of it to adopt are not jointly made, it is more suitable to apply a 
“double-hurdle” model, in which a probit regression on adoption (using all observations) is 
followed by a truncated regression on the non-zero observations (Cragg 1971). Holding the 
argument that adoption and intensity of use decisions may not necessarily be made jointly, and 
that the factors affecting each decision may be different, leads to the use of the double-hurdle 
model, in which the event of a farmer being a potential adopter and the extent of adoption are 
treated separately.7  
The double-hurdle model has rarely been used in the area of adoption and intensity of 
land conservation investments and input uses. An exception we know of is Gebremedhin and 
Swinton (2003), who applied the double-hurdle model in their study on investment in soil 
conservation in northern Ethiopia. 
2.3  The Double-Hurdle Model and Its Variants 
In cases where the dependent variable with positive values and a large proportion of 
zeroes (which is the case in this study where 84% of observations have zero values), ordinary 
least squares (OLS) econometric techniques are biased, even asymptotically. Simply omitting the 
zero observations and applying OLS also creates bias and would discard a great deal of valuable 
information (Long 1996). An alternative is to estimate the Tobit model,8 which provides 
consistent estimates of the parameters. The Tobit model, which has been used in analysis of 
adoption, can be stated as:  
n i u x y i i i ,...., 1
' * = + = β                    (4) 
                                                 
7 Moreover, as underscored in Feder et al. (1992), it is necessary to go beyond the typical binary dependent variable 
methods applied to cross-sectional surveys on technology adoption. 
8 The Tobit model was created by James Tobin (1958) in his analysis of household expenditure on durable goods 
and has since been applied to a large number of econometric models concerning censored data. Censoring occurs 
when there is an underlying continuous variable, but some subset of the range of values of the variable is coded to 
one number, thereby creating a mass point—zero value in our case. Environment for Development  Bekele and Mekonnen 
10 
) , 0 ( ~
2 σ N u i  , 
where yi* is a latent variable representing household i’s propensity to adopt, xi is a vector of farm 
household and plot characteristics relevant in explaining the extent of adoption, β is 
corresponding vector of parameters to be estimated, and ui is a homoskedastic and normally 
distributed error term.  
Let yi be the actual adoption (level of investment in land conservation and input). Since 
actual adoption cannot be negative, the relationship between yi* and yi is:  
) 0 , max(
*
i i y y =  .  (5) 
Equation (5) gives rise to the standard censored regression (Tobit) model. The log-
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in which “0” indicates summation over the zero observations in the sample, while “+” indicates 
summation over positive observations, and Φ(.) and φ (.) are the standard normal cumulative 
distribution functions (CDF) and probability distribution functions (PDF), respectively.  
The Tobit model has a number of potential shortcomings due to the restrictive 
assumptions it makes. First, it assumes that the same stochastic process determines both the 
value of continuous observations on the dependent variable and the discrete switch at zero (see, 
e.g., Blundell and Meghir 1987). Such assumption may not be appropriate to our study because 
the factors that affect whether or not a household adopts land conservation investment may be 
significantly different from the factors that affect how much to invest. Second, the Tobit model 
also assumes that all zero observations are, in fact, standard corner solutions and that households 
that do not adopt do so as a result of their economic circumstances. This is again incongruent to 
our study because it is possible that some farm households would never state a positive amount 
as a matter of principle9 or because they consider land conservation investment or input use as a 
                                                 
9 It may be that they do not believe it is their responsibility to take care of the land, which is possible in Ethiopia 
where land is not privately owned, or it may be that they do not adopt because of their belief that their adoption will 
unlikely make any real difference. Environment for Development  Bekele and Mekonnen 
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bad. Moreover, maximum likelihood estimation for the Tobit model assumes that the errors are 
normal and homoskedastic, in the violation of which (each assumption) the maximum likelihood 
estimator is inconsistent (Maddala and Nelson 1975 and Arabmazar and Schmidt 1982, as cited 
in Long 1996). The p-Tobit model has also been proposed as an alternative, but this is 
generalized by the use of the double-hurdle model.  
The double-hurdle model is a parametric generalization of the Tobit model by 
introducing an additional hurdle, which must be passed for positive observations to be observed. 
As the name “double-hurdle” suggests, farm households must scale two hurdles in order to invest 
in land conservation. There may be farmers who do not adopt, and hence fall at the first hurdle, 
and others who pass the first hurdle. The model’s underlying assumption in our setting is that 
farm households make two decisions with regard to their investment in land conservation and use 
of inputs. Their first decision is whether they will make any land conservation investment at all, 
while their second decision is the level of land conservation investment, conditional on their first 
decision.  
In the double-hurdle model, both hurdles have equations associated with them, 
incorporating the effects of adopter characteristics and circumstances. An explanatory variable 
may appear in both equations or in either of them, and a variable appearing in both equations 
may have opposite effects in the two equations. The double-hurdle model contains two equations 
(adoption equation and equation on level of adoption [Moffatt 2003]):  
i i i z d ε α + =
' *
       







































* d  is a latent adoption variable that takes the value 1 if the household adopted land 
conservation investment, and 0 otherwise; z is a vector of explanatory variables; and α  is a 
vector of parameters. y represents intensity of adoption and x is a vector of explanatory variables, 
and β  is a vector of parameters.  
As shown in the last expression of equation (7), the two error terms ( i ε  and  i u ) are 
assumed to be normally and independently distributed. The first hurdle is then represented by:  Environment for Development  Bekele and Mekonnen 
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1 = i d    if     0
*> i d   (8)                         
0 = i d    if      0
*≤ i d  ; 
the second hurdle is given by:  
( ) 0 , max
* * *
i i y y =  ;  (9)  
and the observed variable i y  is finally determined by equation (10):  
*
i i i y d y =  .  (10) 
The log-likelihood function for the double hurdle model is:  
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  (11) 
The double-hurdle model (as originally proposed by Cragg 1971) is equivalent to a 
combination of a truncated regression model and a univariate probit model, provided the 
assumption of independence between the error terms  i ε  and  i u , stated in equation (7), holds. 
Following Cragg (1971), the decision on adoption can be modeled as a probit regression 
(Gebremedhin and Swinton 2003): 
) ( ) , 1 (
'
1 2 1 β X C X X y f = =  ,  (12) 
where C(.) is the normal cumulative distribution function, and  1 X  and  2 X  are vectors of 
independent variables, not necessarily distinct. The decision on the intensity of use can be 
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For this paper, we estimated both the double-hurdle and standard Tobit models and select 
the appropriate model. We used the econometric software STATA, version 9.0. 
2.4  Heteroskedasticity and Panel Effect 
Given the panel nature of the data (multiple plot-level observations for each household), 
we attempted to control for the panel nature of the data, using clustering probit, Tobit, and 
truncated models available in STATA. The regressions were analyzed using robust estimators to 
account for clustering within households. For the Tobit model, the standard errors were adjusted 
for clustering on household identification by using interval estimation for Tobit with cluster.10  In 
principle, the result from such estimation is comparable with the results using the Tobit 
command. Because the point estimates are the same and because all of the predictors are still 
significant with the robust standard errors, the interpretation will be the same as the Tobit 
model.11  
2.5  Test for Model Appropriateness: Tobit versus Double-Hurdle Model  
A test for the Tobit model against the double-hurdle model comes from the fact that the 
hurdle model log likelihood can always be written as the sum of the log likelihoods of the two 
separate models: a probit and a truncated model. As such the hurdle model likelihood function 
can always be maximized, without loss of information, by maximizing the two components 
separately (McDowell 2003).  
Therefore, whether a Tobit or a double hurdle model is more appropriate can be 
determined by separately estimating the Tobit and the double hurdle models (the truncated 
regression model and the probit model) separately and then conducting a likelihood ratio test that 
                                                 
10 As there is no robust option in the Stata Tobit command (in STATA, version 9.0, at least), a Tobit analysis with 
robust standard errors is addressed in this study by making use of interval estimation through the “intreg” command. 
To use this command, however, we reconfigured the dependent variable (level of investment in land conservation), 
so that it would work with intreg. The intreg command requires two values of the response variable for each 
observation. If we called these two values lX and uX, then for those cases in which the response is not censored both 
lX and uX are set to the same value. When a response is right-censored, uX is set to missing and when the response 
is left -censored, lX is set to missing. There are no right-censored responses in this analysis, thus the dependent 
variable is set to match the latter. 
11 See, for example, www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/dae/tobit2.htm. Environment for Development  Bekele and Mekonnen 
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compares the Tobit with the sum of the log likelihood functions of the probit and truncated 
regression models.12  
3. Data, Results, and Interpretation 
The main source of data for this study was primary data collected from interviews with 
rural households in East Gojjam and South Wello zones of the Amhara region of Ethiopia with 
the general objective of studying household behavior regarding sustainable land use in the 
Ethiopian highlands. The data was collected as part of a collaborative research project by the 
economics departments at Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia, and University of Gothenburg, 
Sweden, with financial support from Sida/SAREC. Households that were interviewed in the first 
round (year 2000) were re-interviewed in the second (year 2002) and third (year 2005) rounds. 
The necessary variables for this study were available in the second and third rounds of these 
surveys. 
3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics              
A total of 1,520 households from 12 sites (villages or kebeles13), with a minimum of 120 
households from each site, were interviewed in each of the two rounds. Two more sites (i.e., 240 
households) and some new questions were included in the third round (year 2005). This made a 
total of 1,760 households in 14 sites interviewed in the third round. The selection of the sites was 
deliberate to ensure variation in the characteristics of the sites, including agro-ecology and 
vegetative cover. Households from each site were then selected using simple random sampling.  
Some of the variables of interest to this study were not included in the first two rounds, so 
this study focused mainly on analyzing the data gathered in the third round and included poverty- 
and asset-related variables from the second round. The regression analysis in this study used 
                                                 
12 The likelihood ratio test statistics Γ  can be computed (Greene 2000) as: 
2
2 ln (ln ln ) ~ LL L Tp T Rk χ Γ=− − + ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ , where  T L  is the likelihood for the Tobit model;  p L  is the likelihood for 
the probit model;  TR L  is the likelihood for the truncated regressions model; and k is the number of independent 
variables in the equations. If the test hypothesis is written as: 
σ
β
λ = : 0 H   and  
σ
β
λ ≠ : 1 H  , then  0 H  will be rejected on a prespecified significance level, provided 
2
k X > Γ , confirming the superiority of the double-hurdle specification over the Tobit model. In such a case, the 
decision to state a positive value for land conservation investment practices and input uses and the decision about 
how much to state will appear to be governed by different processes 
13 A kebele is the smallest administrative unit of local government in Ethiopia, similar to a ward or a neighborhood 
association. Environment for Development  Bekele and Mekonnen 
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6,408 household plots, after dropping the remaining plots due to missing values. The data 
gathered a host of household-related variables, as well as plot-level data, including land 
conservation practices and inputs, and questions pertaining to household poverty, land tenure 
security, and market incentives. 
Table 1 (in the appendix) presents the definitions and observation level of the variables 
included in the analysis. The dependent variable in the first-stage probit model is the farm 
households’ adoption of land conservation investment on specific plots, which takes a value of 1 
if a plot receives land conservation investment (structure) and 0 otherwise. The level of land 
conservation or intensity of investment in land conservation was also used as another dependent 
variable in the second-stage truncated model. The rest of the variables listed in table 1 are 
explanatory variables. Following the conceptual framework and the hypothesis developed earlier 
in this paper, we classified the variables used in the analysis into six broad categories:14 poverty-
related factors,15 risk or land tenure security,16 market access, physical incentives, alternative 
input uses, and village dummies.  
Table 2 (in the appendix) provides summary statistics for all the dependent and 
explanatory variables used in our analysis for the full sample, non-adopters, and adopters of land 
conservation investment. Land conservation adoption, which is used as the dependent variable 
for the probit, is undertaken on about 16% of the plots. The mean length of land conservation 
structure on a plot is 42.022 and 267.937 meters per hectare for the full sample and the adopting 
plots, respectively. This is far less than the average requirement of 700 meters per hectare of 
stone terraces or soil bunds to conserve a hectare of land and reduce soil erosion effectively on 
typical sloped areas in northern Ethiopia, as estimated by Gebremedhin and Swinton (2003). The 
rest of the variables in table 2 are explanatory variables. 
                                                 
14 For simplicity, some variables were classified into a category that better (at least for this study) described them. 
For instance, access to credit could have been included in the market access category rather than with poverty-
related factors.  
15 Because of the gender specific nature of the division of labor in most rural areas of Ethiopia, we made a 
distinction in the availability of labor between the two sexes.  
16 Farm fragmentation can be expressed by three measures:  the number of plots; the average distance to the parcels 
in each farm; and the Simpson index, which can be calculated as 1 minus the ratio of the sum of squared parcel areas 
to the squared area of the total farm. (The Simpson index is 0 when the farm consists of a single parcel and 
approaches 1 for farms split into numerous plots of equal size.) The simplex index portrays how fragmented farm 
plot holdings are, combining the number of plots by farm household and their relative size (see Bellon and Taylor 
1993). Environment for Development  Bekele and Mekonnen 
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3.2  Model Appropriateness: Tobit versus Double-Hurdle Model  
Noting that land conservation adoption and intensity of use decisions may not necessarily 
be made jointly, and that the factors affecting each decision may be different, we estimated both 
Tobit and double-hurdle models (probit and truncated regression models) separately, and then 
conducted a likelihood ratio test. (In the appendix, see table 4 for the probit and table 4.5 for the 
Tobit17 and truncated regression model estimation results. Table 3 portrays the results of this 
likelihood ratio test.)  
The results of the likelihood ratio test favor the use of the double-hurdle model. It shows 
that the likelihood ratio test statistics Γ is 707.62, which exceeds the critical value [χ
2(48) ≈ 
76.15] at the 1%-level of significance. This confirms the superiority of the double-hurdle 
specification over the Tobit model; thus, the plot-level decision to state a positive value for land 
conservation investment and the decision about how much to state seem to be governed by 
different processes. This is also confirmed by the result of the Akaike’s information criterion, 
which we included as an alternative model selection criterion. The less formal “test” of 
comparing the probit (table 4 in the appendix) and Tobit (table 5 in the appendix) estimated 
coefficients also confirmed the above test results. This is implied from the existence of several 
variables that significantly affect adoption decision without being significant factors for the 
intensity decision, and vice versa. Even among those that affect both adoption and intensity, the 
direction of effect for some is different. The decision to adopt land conservation and the decision 
about how much to invest appear to be explained by different processes.  
3.3 Determinants of Adoption of Land Conservation Investment 
The results of the clustered-probit estimations for adoption decisions are presented in 
table 4 in the appendix.18 The table reports the estimated coefficients, their robust standard errors 
(adjusted for clustering on household identification), and the marginal effects. The adjusted R-
squared (the pseudo R-squared for probit) and the chi-square test results are presented at the 
bottom of the table. The estimated likelihood ratio test shows that the model is a good fit overall. 
                                                 
17 Standard errors for the Tobit model were adjusted for clustering on household identification, using interval 
estimation for Tobit with cluster (see section 3.4).  
 
18 Gujarati (1995) states that multicollinearity may become a problem if the coefficient of the Pearson correlation 
exceeds 90%. Following this, a correlation matrix was created among the independent varibles, and none of the 
correlation coefficient exceeded 48%. Environment for Development  Bekele and Mekonnen 
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The pseudo R-squared shows that the regression explains 23% of the total variation in the 
dependent variable.  
The probit regression estimates confirm that the probability of adopting land conservation 
investment is influenced by a wide range of factors. The results are discussed below with a focus 
on poverty-related factors, land tenure security, and market access.  
Poverty-Related Factors 
The role played by poverty-related factors in determining investment on land 
conservation and input uses has been emphasized in various research works. In particular, 
the negative relationship between poverty (in its different forms) and a household’s decisions 
to invest on land conservation and with what intensity is substantiated in various  studies  
(see, e.g., Hagos and  Holden 2006,  Gebremedhin  and  Swinton  2003,  Clay et  al. 2002, 
Holden and Shiferaw 2002, Holden et al. 1998, and Godoy et al. 2001).  
Following is our result detailing poverty into income and asset variables. Cash-income 
(in all its forms), value of live trees, access to extension services, household belief of future life 
improvement, and household consumption expenditure are statistically significant poverty-
related factors that explain farm households’ investment decision in land conservation. Of the 
cash-income variables, the negative effect of non-crop income and employment income is in line 
with the argument that wages and incomes from competing non-farm opportunities can 
discourage farmers’ probability of investing in land conservation. This suggests that better 
returns from non-owned farms will compete for both labor and investment capital that could be 
used in agriculture.  
The results indicate that cash-crop income is a statistically significant factor that reduces 
a household’s probability of deciding to conserve the land. Theoretically, cash-crop income 
should encourage land conservation investment decisions by providing an incentive to farm 
households to improve land quality in the hope that the plot can provide more product (and, 
hence, more income) in the next crop season. While access to credit could mean better capacity 
to invest in land conservation, better access to credit is found to be associated with lower 
probability of adoption.  
Except for the value of live trees, none of the non-liquid asset variables were found to 
affect the probability of plots receiving land conservation investment. Value of live trees is a 
statistically significant factor that increases households’ probability of investing in land 
conservation. While this result for trees could be interpreted as a reflection of the wealth of the Environment for Development  Bekele and Mekonnen 
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household in land conservation investment decisions, it can also be that the two are 
complements.  
Except for household access to extension services, none of the human-capital variables 
were found to significantly affect decisions in land conservation investment. The results suggest 
that households with access to extension services are more likely to invest in land conservation. 
This shows the relative importance of extension services in encouraging decisions by farm 
households to invest in land conservation structures, perhaps through its effects on awareness 
and knowledge about such structures.  
Households’ social capital, as measured by a household’s belief that life conditions will 
improve in the future, was found to be significant. In particular, the results suggest that 
households’ probability of investing in land conservation is higher for households that are 
pessimistic about future life condition improvements. Household consumption expenditure is 
found to decrease the probability of a household’s decision to invest in land conservation. This is 
similar to the results for measures of cash income reported above and it suggests that richer 
households (using household expenditure as an indicator) are less likely to invest in land 
conservation.  
The above result confirms that defining poverty in specific measurement units (such as 
cash-income, non-liquid asset, human and social capital assets) is important in land 
conservation studies. Given that assets often matter in natural resource management, 
defining poverty in accordance with income and/or expenditure  alone sets a much smaller 
cut-off than the bare minimum requirement by the poor to address issues of resource 
degradation. That is, sizeable resources over and above bare subsistence consumption 
and production amounts are required by the poor to address issues of resource degradation.  
Land Tenure Security 
Except for the variable for land ownership type, all the land tenure [in]security variables 
were found to be statistically insignificant. This result suggests that plots that are owner-
cultivated have a higher probability of receiving land conservation than plots either mortgaged 
(in/out) or rented (in/out). Specifically, a privately-owned plot increases the probability that 
farmers will invest in land conservation on it by 3%. Due to the usually short duration of tenure 
holding and other incentive problems associated with plots that are rented or mortgaged, such 
plots are less likely to receive land conservation investment than a plot that is owner-cultivated. 
This result is in line with the neo-classical economic theory that suggests, all things being equal, 
that reduced risk and longer planning horizons should enhance expected returns and encourage Environment for Development  Bekele and Mekonnen 
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investment. It also supports earlier works, such as Tekie (1999), Feder et al. (1988), 
Gebremedhin and Swinton (2003), and Rahmato (1992).  
Market Access 
A household’s expectation of a return on land conservation investment (proxied by 
households’ expectation of a long-term effect of fertilizer) turned out to be the only market 
access variable that affected a households’ decision to adopt land conservation investment. A 
household which expected returns from land investment to increase productivity had a higher 
probability of investing in land conservation. This may be due to the importance of perceived 
positive marginal benefits received from undertaking land investment in terms of land quality 
improvements and  increased yield in influencing households’ behavior toward investment in 
those measures.  
Physical Incentives 
Most of the indicators of physical incentives to invest in a plot, as reflected by plot-level 
variables, seem to have a role in a household’s adoption decision. In particular, plot altitude 
negatively affects plot-level adoption probability. This may be explained by a tendency towards 
water-logging of vertisol soils,19 which would discourage farm households from practices that 
would retain water on vertisol plots. A plot in the highlands (2,500 meters above sea level) 
decreases the probability that it will receive land conservation investment by 7%. Plots situated 
on steep (dagetama) slopes have a 5% probability of receiving land conservation investment. 
(Plots on steep slopes are associated with soil erosion and are often vulnerable to land 
degradation, and thus are likely to receive land conservation.)  
There is a positive relationship between plot size and the probability of the plot receiving 
land conservation investment. On average, an increase in size of a plot by one hectare increases 
the probability that a plot will receive land conservation investment by 10%. This may be 
explained by the fact that farmers are likely to invest first and foremost in their largest parcel, 
often where their residences are also located. An alternative explanation for the positive 
relationship between plot size and adoption of land conservation may be that larger plots are 
expected to yield greater rewards and justify the costs of construction. Plots mainly used for tree 
planting have a lower probability (5%) of receiving land conservation investment than plots used 
                                                 
19 These are black soils rich in clay content with an unstable structure. They have a low permeability for water 
(characterized by excess surface water) and form deep vertical cracks in dry seasons. Environment for Development  Bekele and Mekonnen 
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for annual crops and/or fallowing. Similarly, plots used for grazing have a lower probability 
(about 8%) of receiving land conservation investment.  
Alternative Land Inputs 
With respect to use of alternative land conservation practices, past land-conservation 
investment intensity and current natural fertilizer use were found to be statistically significant. 
The higher the intensity of previous land conservation investment on a plot, then the less likely it 
is that the plot will receive new land conservation investment. This shows the preference of farm 
households to invest first in plots that are not well conserved or plots with limited or no previous 
conservation structures. Natural fertilizer use is found to complement the probability of the plot 
to benefit from land conservation investment.  
Village- or Site-Level Effects 
The last set of explanatory variables in our analysis includes village/site or kebele 
dummies. The results indicate that almost half of the village dummies were found to be 
statistically significant—and the association is positive for some and negative for others, 
suggesting the importance of site-level fixed effects (or variations across sites). 
3.4 Determinants of Intensity of Land Conservation Investment 
About 1,005 (or 16%) of the plot-level observations have positive land-conservation 
investment intensity. This section presents the truncated regression estimation results. The Wald 
chi-square test results (presented at the bottom right of table 5 in the appendix) signify that the 
model in the overall is statistically significant, at least at the 1% level. The first point to be noted 
from the results is that many of the determinants of level of land conservation have effects 
contrary to those of the determinants of adoption.  
Poverty-Related Factors 
Similar to the results for adoption probability, cash-crop income has a negative and 
statistically significant relationship with the intensity of conservation. This result was not 
expected because an increase in cash income should have implied increased land-conservation 
investment through the greater capacity of the farm household. Access to credit, although 
significant in influencing adoption decision, turned out to be insignificant in the model for 
intensity of investment.  
An increase of one hectare in total land holding increases plot-level conservation 
intensity by about 182 meters per hectare. This can be due to the nature of land conservation and Environment for Development  Bekele and Mekonnen 
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input technologies involved because land conservation requires space. Moreover, the value of 
live trees turns out to have a positive influence on intensity:  an additional ETB20 100 in the 
value of live trees is associated with an increase in the level of land conservation investment by 
about 2 meters per hectare. This is in line with the general expectation that assets, which indicate 
more wealth and capacity to conserve land, can increase the intensity of the investment.  
The value of livestock, on the other hand, was found to be associated with lower intensity 
of land conservation investment. This result is contrary to the general expectation that livestock 
is an important indicator of wealth in rural Ethiopia and, hence, is expected to be positively 
associated with intensity of land conservation. However, it is possible that households with more 
livestock may use their plots for grazing, which often does not entail land conservation 
structures.  
Two of the human capital variables have a statistically significant influence on the 
intensity of land conservation, namely, female adult per capital variable and access to soil 
conservation advice. Both variables have a positive association with land conservation intensity. 
An additional female adult in the household per hectare increases intensity by about 41 meters 
per hectare. Given the presence of poorly functioning labor markets in our study areas, this result 
suggests that more labor availability in the household encourages land conservation investment. 
We do not have a good explanation as to why female adult labor is significant and not male adult 
labor. However, the result seems to amplify the gender-specific nature of labor division in 
Ethiopia, suggesting that female labor availability represents a different asset type and is more 
important in intensifying land conservation investment.  
Households’ access to development agents’ advice on soil conservation positively affects 
intensity. Compared to households that have never received advice about soil conservation, land-
conservation intensity increased for those who were advised by about 220 meters per hectare. It 
is also interesting to note that, while access to extension services (which often focuses on general 
issues related to agriculture) affects adoption, access to advice on soil conservation affects 
intensity. This suggests that once the household passes the first hurdle of the adoption decision, 
advice on specific soil conservation issues is more important in order for the household to 
intensify land conservation investment.  
 
                                                 
20 ETB = Ethiopian birr. As of February 2010, ETB 13.22 = US$ 1. Environment for Development  Bekele and Mekonnen 
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Land Tenure (In)Security 
Households that feel certain that they will cultivate the plot for a longer period (five years 
after the survey) are associated with higher intensity of land conservation investment. Compared 
to those uncertain about cultivating the plot for the next five years, land conservation investment 
intensity was higher by about 182 meters per hectare for those feel certain. This result suggests 
that expectation for land tenure is important in influencing intensity of conservation investment. 
Compared to those households that believe the land belongs to the peasant association or to the 
government, land conservation investment intensity decreased by 169 meters per hectare among 
those who believe that land belongs to them—a result we find difficult to explain since one 
would have expected the reverse. Also, greater distance of plots from the homestead is associated 
with higher intensity:  an increase of 10 walking minutes from home to the plot increases plot-
level intensity by 140 meters per hectare.  
At first glance, this result seemed contrary to our prior expectations that plots not remote 
from the homestead would receive more land conservation investment, due not only to the lesser 
transaction cost involved but also the stronger degree of security attached to homestead farms (or 
farms closer to the homestead), where land redistribution is infrequent. The result, however, 
makes more sense when one examines the rural land policy of Ethiopia. According to the Rural 
Land Administration and Land Use Proclamation of Ethiopia, “a holder of rural land shall have 
the obligation, among others, to use and protect his land. And when the land gets damaged, the 
land user should lose his right.” Plots at far distances from the homestead are where frequent 
land redistribution often occurs. Thus, a possible explanation is that households are perhaps 
conserving first a plot at remote distance from their residences in an attempt to have greater 
security over the plot.  
Market Access 
Unlike the adoption model, distance of a residence from the market turned out to be 
statistically significant in influencing intensity:  an increase of 10 walking minutes from the 
household’s residence to the market place increases intensity by approximately 19 meters per 
hectare. This is perhaps because the limited or absent alternative off-farm employment 
opportunities (during the dry season, in particular) and the prevalence of lower wages in distant 
places reduce the opportunity cost of family labor and the cost of hiring labor, and thus lower the 
opportunity cost of labor-intensive investments in land conservation. Return on investment is 
highly significant in both adoption and intensity models. Compared to households that expect the 
return from land investment will be increased productivity, intensity decreases by about 249 Environment for Development  Bekele and Mekonnen 
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meters per hectare for households that expect returns from land investment to decrease or at least 
not change productivity. This suggests the importance of perceived positive marginal benefits 
received from undertaking investment in terms of land quality improvements and increased yield 
in influencing households’ behavior toward such investments.  
Physical Incentives 
Among the physical incentives, plot soil fertility, plot area, and grazing plots were found 
to be significant in influencing investment intensity in land conservation. The positive effects of 
soil fertility suggest that fertile plots entail a higher return and hence receive a higher level of 
land conservation investment. On the other hand, the negative relationship between plot area and 
intensity is perhaps because intensity in our model is measured as meters per hectare. As in 
Gebremedhin and Swinton (2003) also argued, larger fields have fewer meters of conservation 
per hectare because of their indivisibility and diminishing marginal returns on conservation 
structures within a plot. Plots mainly used for grazing seem to be associated with a higher 
intensity than plots that are mainly used for farming and/or fallowing, a result we are not able to 
explain.    
Alternative Land Conservation Practices and Site Dummies 
 None of the alternative land conservation practices were found to be statistically 
significant in influencing intensity of land conservation investment. Some of the site dummies 
were significant, suggesting that there are differences in intensity of land conservation across 
sites. 
4. Summary and Conclusions   
Land degradation is a major problem undermining land productivity in Ethiopia. This 
study explores the factors affecting farm households’ decision to invest in land conservation and 
their decision on how much to invest at the plot level, focusing on the roles of poverty, land 
tenure [in]security, and market access. The main source of data for this study was primary data 
collected from interviews of a sample of rural households in the Amhara region of Ethiopia. The 
regression analysis of the household-plot level data used a double-hurdle model. We used a large 
set of explanatory variables to explain farmers’ plot-level decisions whether or not to invest in 
land conservation, as well as how much to invest.   
The results in this study demonstrate that the decision to adopt land conservation 
investment and the decision about how much to invest appear to be explained by different 
processes. The relevant policy and program tools for encouraging land conservation investment Environment for Development  Bekele and Mekonnen 
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depend on whether or not farm households are already convinced of the need to adopt land 
conservation investments. In general, policymakers will find that poverty-related factors, such as 
cash-income, value of livestock, access to extension services, and a household’s belief in future 
life improvement; land ownership type (tenure [in]security factor); household’s expectation of a 
return from land investment (market access factor); physical incentives, such as plot altitude, plot 
slope, plot area, major use of the plot (for tree planting, grazing); and alternative land 
conservation practices, such as previous land conservation intensity and intensity of natural 
fertilizer use are important in plot-level decision to adopt land conservation investment.  
For the farm households who have already decided to invest in land conservation, 
poverty-related variables comprising cash-crop income, farm size, value of livestock, value of 
live trees, female adult per hectare, and access to advice on soil conservation; land tenure 
[in]security variables, including households’ expectation of cultivating the plot for the next five 
years, belief of land ownership, and distance from plot to home; market access factors, including 
distance from residence to market and expectation on return from land conservation investment; 
and physical incentive factors, including plot soil fertility, plot size, and major use of plot (plots 
for grazing) are the key factors influencing plot-level intensity of investment in land 
conservation.  
In general, our study confirms the complexity of land-conservation investment decisions. 
This is highlighted by the large number of statistically significant variables in the models, each 
marginally contributing to the overall decision to invest or not, as well as to the decision on how 
much to invest. A lesson for policymakers is that major changes in land conservation 
investments will require attention to all these factors because no single factor can be used as a 
major policy leverage instrument. Some of these factors (such as land tenure security, plot size, 
and total farm holdings) can be directly influenced by government policies and programs.  Environment for Development  Bekele and Mekonnen 
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Appendix 
Table 1. Definition and Observation Level of the Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
Variables Definition  Obs.  level 
Land conservation adoption     
(dependent variable) 
Implemented new soil conservation works in the 
past 12 months:  1 if implemented; 0 if otherwise  Plot 
Level of land conservation 
(dependent variable) 
Length of land conservation investments in the 
last 12 months: in meters per hectare  Plot 
Poverty-related factors 
Income     
Non-crop income  Sale of livestock and their products, energy, trees, 
and gift:  ETB/year  Household 
Employment income  Income from outside agricultural employment:  
ETB/year  Household 
Cash-crop income  Income from sale of production:  ETB/year  Household 
Access to credit   Household had access to credit over ETB 200 per 
year:  1 if yes; 0 if no   Household 
Non-liquid assets     
Farm size   Total land holding by the household in current 
year:  in hectares    Household 
No.  of cattle
  Number of cattle owned by the household    Household 
No. of ruminants   Number of ruminants owned by the household  Household 
Value of livestock  Monetary value of livestock owned if sold:  in 
ETB/year  Household 
Value of live trees  Monetary value of live trees owned if sold:  in 
ETB/year  Household 
Value of crop produced   Market value of crop output produced if sold:  in 
ETB/year  Household 
Human capital     
Male adults per hectare  Number of male adults between 12 and 65 years 
of age per hectare  Household 
Female adults per hectare  Number of female adults between 12 and 65 
years of age per hectare   Household 
Dependent ratio  Ratio of non-working-age household members to 
working-age members (12–65 years)   Household 
Age of household head   Age of head of the household:  no. of years  Household 
Sex of household head  Sex of head of the household:  1 if male; 0 if 
female  Household 
Literacy of head  Literacy of head of the household:  1 if reading 
and writing; 0 otherwise    Household 
Marital status of head   Marital status of head of the household:  1 if  Household Environment for Development  Bekele and Mekonnen 
30 
married; 0 otherwise   
Access to extension services  Household access to extension services:  1 if has 
access; 0 if not  Household 
Soil conservation advice  Development agents advised household on soil 
conservation:  1 if advised; 0 if not.   Household 
Life improvements:  Social  
capital 
Household’s belief that life condition will improve 
in the future:  1 = definitely possible; 2 = possible; 
3 = not sure; 4 = impossible; 5 = completely 
impossible 
Household 
Household expenditure   Household expenditure per annum:  in ETB  Household 
Risk factors for land tenure security 
Cultivate plot for next 5 years   Plot owners feels certain will cultivate plot 5 years 
from now:  1 if certain; 0 if not  Plot 
Land ownership type  Type of land ownership:  1 if owner-operated; 0 if 
otherwise (mortgage or rent in/out)  Plot 
Land ownership belief  Household believes that it owns land:  1 if yes; 0 
otherwise*
  Household 
Plot-home distance  Distance of plot from residence:  in walking 
minutes   Plot 
Simpson Index:  Index of land 
fragmentation 
1 minus the ratio of the sum of squared plot areas 
to the squared area of the total farm size of the 
household: plot fragmentation index  
Household 
Plot age   Number of years since land was held by the 
household  Plot 
Market access 
Town-to-residence distance  Distance of household residence to nearest town: 
in walking minutes  Household 
Road-to-residence distance  Distance of  residence to nearest car road:  in 
walking minutes    Household 
Market-to-residence distance  Distance of residence to market where most 
products sold:  in walking minutes  Household 
Return from investment  
Proxy by household expectation of long-term 
effect of fertilizer:  1 if decreases or no change to 
productivity; 0 if increases productivity 
Household 
Physical incentives 
Highland    Plot altitude from sea level:  1 if above 2,500 
meters; 0 otherwise   Plot 
Soil fertility  Fertility of the plot’s soil:  3 if fertile; 2 if medium; 1 
if low fertility  Plot 
Plot slope   Slope of the plot:  1if steep uphill (dagetama); 0 
otherwise  Plot 
Plot area  Plot area:  in hectares  Plot 
Plot access to irrigation   Plot has access to irrigation:  1 if irrigated; 0 if not 
irrigated   Plot 
Major use of plot **     Environment for Development  Bekele and Mekonnen 
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Tree plant  Major use of the plot is for tree planting:  1 if yes; 
0 otherwise  Plot 
Grazing  Major use of the plot is for grazing:  1 if yes; 0 
otherwise  Plot 
Input 
Past land investment intensity  Length of land conservation investments before 
the last 12 months:  in meters    Plot 
Modern fertilizer use  Modern fertilizer used over the last 12 months:  in 
kilograms   Plot 
Natural fertilizer use  Natural fertilizer use over the last 12 months:  in 
kilograms  Plot 
Village dummy*** 
Amanuel   1 if village is Amanuel; 0 otherwise  Prefecture 
D. Elias  1 if village is D. Elias; 0 otherwise  Prefecture 
Kebi  1 if village is Kebi; 0 otherwise  Prefecture 
Telma  1 if village is Telma; 0 otherwise  Prefecture 
Yamed  1 if village is Yamed; 0 otherwise  Prefecture 
Wolkie  1 if village is Wolkie; 0 otherwise  Prefecture 
Sekladebir  1 if village is Sekladebir; 0 otherwise  Prefecture 
ETB = Ethiopian birr (currency) 
* Zero is when household believes the land belongs to either the kebele (peasant association) or the 
government. 
** The base group for the major use of plot dummy is “plot with major use for farming and/or fallowing.”  
*** The base group for the village dummies includes these villages:  “Kete,” “Godguadit,” “Ambamariam,” 
“Addismender,” “Chorisa,” “Indodber,” and “Addisgulit.” 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for Full Sample, Adopters, and Non-adopters  
of Land Conservation Investment 
 
Variables 
Full sample  
 (N = 6408) 
Adopting 
(N = 1005) 
Non-adopting  
(N = 5403) 
Mean  Std. dev.  Mean  Std. dev.  Mean  Std. dev. 
Land conservation adoption  0.157 0.364  1  0  0  0 
Level of land conservation  
(m
2 per  hectare) 
42.022 146.5799  267.937 276.621  - - 
Poverty-related factors 
Income 
Non-crop income  511.630  593.447 478.186 518.165 517.851  606.259 
Employment income  139.115  367.698 102.047 279.019 146.010  381.553 
Cash-crop income  204.381  304.990 186.477 253.005 207.711  313.618 
Access to credit  .192  .394 .178 .383 .195  .396 
Non-liquid assets 
Farm size  1.607  1.224  1.492 1.116 1.628  1.243 
No. of cattle  4.145  3.688  3.581 2.844 4.249  3.816 
No. of ruminants  1.770  3.102 1.681 2.890 1.787  3.140 
Value of livestock  1808.841  1568.159  1622.674 1342.553 1843.470  1604.362 
Value of trees  2248.913  4404.926  2664.518 5092.195 2171.607  4260.956 
Value of crop produced  893.176  1191.950 900.139 1308.161 891.881  1169.187 
Human capital 
Male adults per hectare  2.161  1.910 2.222 1.992 2.149  1.990 
Female adults per hectare  2.181 2.112 2.198 1.852 2.178  2.157 
Ratio of dependents  .650  .545 .616 .483 .657  .556 
Age of household head  50.059  14.466 49.781 14.890 50.111  14.387 
Sex of household head  .882  .322 .876 .330 .883  .321 
Literacy of household head  .514 .500 .488 .500 .519  .500 
Marital status of household head  .881 .324 .852 .356 .886  .318 
Access to extension advice  .506  .500 .586 .493 .492  .500 
Soil conservation advice  .376  .485 .387 .487 .374  .484 
Life improvements  2.473  .970  2.550  1.020  2.459  .961 
Household expenditure  1399.221  1110.071  1237.133  888.093  1429.371  1144.170 
Risk factors (land tenure security) 
Will cultivate plot for next  
5 years 
.695 .461 .752 .432 .684  .465 Environment for Development  Bekele and Mekonnen 
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Land ownership type  .814  .389 .845 .362 .808  .394 
Land ownership belief  .448  .497 .497 .500 .439  .496 
Plot-to-residence distance  1.510  2.361 1.602 2.238 1.599  2.383 
Simpson index  .782  .130  .773 .125 .783  .130 
Plot age  18.837  9.549  18.767 9.702 18.850  9.521 
Market access 
Town-to-residence distance  61.439 41.224 68.559 41.523 60.115  41.036 
Residence-to-road distance  33.423  33.265 36.059 32.991 32.933  33.296 
Market-to-residence distance  69.249 38.357 72.896 41.088 68.571  37.792 
Return from investment  .380  .486 .308 .462 .394  .489 
Physical incentives 
Plot characteristics             
Highland .318  .466  .306 .461 .320  .467 
Plot fertility  2.272  .723  2.293 .703 2.268  .727 
Plot slope  .057  .232  .094 .291 .050  .219 
Plot access  .216  .180  .217 .163 .216  .183 
Access to irrigation  .044  .205 .047 .211 .044  .204 
Major use of plot 
Tree planting  .048  .213  .041 .198 .049  .216 
Grazing .021  .144  .005 .070 .024  .154 
Input 
Past land investment intensity  25.135 52.409  4.745  19.965 28.928  55.605 
Modern fertilizer use  9.159  20.754 8.867 19.244 9.213  21.024 
Natural fertilizer use  156.256  394.593 182.547 389.796 151.365  395.322 
Note:  Site dummies are included, but not reported here. 
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Table 3. Test for Comparison of Tobit with Double-Hurdle Model 
  Tobit  Double-hurdle model 
 
Probit, D 
Truncated regression,  
Y(Y>0) 
Wald χ
2  259.07  251.41  269.89 
Prob > χ
2 0.0000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
LOG-L  -8832.3405  -2150.628  -6327.9011 
AIC   1.39  0.342  0.995 
Number of observations (N)  6408  6408  1005 
χ
2-test:  double hurdle vs. Tobit  Γ = 707.62 > χ
2(48) = 76.15 
Note: *** Statistically significant at 1% level of significance. 
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Table 4. Probit Estimation: Determinants of Decision to Invest in Land Conservation 
Variables  Robust coeff.  P-value mfx
† 
Poverty-related factors 
Income       
Non-crop income  -.00017*  0.070  -0.000 
Employment income  -.00020*  0.092  -0.000 
Cash-crop income  -.00043**  0.020  -0.0001 
Access to credit  -.196*  0.082  -0.027
†† 
Non-liquid assets       
Farm size  -.030  0.676  -0.004 
No. of cattle  -.019  0.391  -0.003 
No. of ruminants  -.016  0.408  -0.002 
Value of livestock  .00007  0.227  0.000 
Value of trees  .00002**  0.040  0.000 
Value of crop 
produced  .00007 0.214  0.000 
Human capital       
Male adults per 
hectare  .017 0.506  0.003 
Female adults per 
hectare  -.021 0.424  -0.003 
Ratio of dependents  -.116  0.161  -0.017 
Age of household 
head  -.001 0.793  -0.0002 
Sex of household 
head  .128 0.474  0.018
†† 
Literacy of household 
head  -.017 0.866  -0.003 
Marital status of 
household head  -.147 0.402  -0.024
†† 
Access to extension 
agent   .309** 0.017  0.046
†† 
Soil conservation 
advice  -.063 0.631  -0.009 
 Life improvements  .112**  0.030  0.017 
Household 
expenditure 
-.00011**  0.022  -0.000 
Risk factors (land tenure security) 
Will cultivate plot for 
next 5 years 
.117 0.223  0.017
†† Environment for Development  Bekele and Mekonnen 
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Land ownership type  .204**  0.032  0.028
†† 
Land ownership belief  .112  0.230  0.017 
Plot-to-home distance  .016 0.141  0.002 
Simpson index  .222  0.483  0.033 
Plot age  -.002  0.619  -0.0003 
Market access 
Town-to-residence 
distance  .002 0.116  0.0003 
Residence-to-road 
distance  .001 0.467  0.0002 
Market-to-residence 
distance  -.001 0.290  -0.0002 
Return from 
investment  -.364*** <  0.001 -0.051
†† 
Physical incentives 
Plot characteristics       
Highland -.561***  0.001  -0.073
†† 
Plot fertility  -.018  0.725  -0.003 
Plot slope  .260*  0.066  0.045
†† 
Plot access  .690***  < 0.001  0.102 
Access to irrigation  .043  0.781  0.007
†† 
Major use of plots       
Tree planting  -.442***  < 0.001  -0.049
†† 
Grazing -1.282***  <  0.001  -0.080
†† 
Input 
Past land investment 
intensity  -.023*** <  0.001  -0.003 
Modern fertilizer use  .001  0.400  0.0002 
Natural fertilizer use  .0002***  0.001  0.0000 
Constant  -.807**  0.034  - 
Predicted probability 
at mean  
0.16 -  - 
Notes:  Number of observations = 6,408. Log pseudo-likelihood = -2150.628.  Wald chi2(48)/P-value = 
251.41/0.0000.  McFadden’s R
2 = 0.23.   
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on household id.  
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level, respectively. 
Site dummies are included but not reported here.  
†
  mfx represents marginal effect. 
††
 represents change in the probability of a decision to land conservation investment being made for a 
change in the respective explanatory variable from 0 to 1.  
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Table 5. Tobit and Truncation Estimations:  
Determinants of Level of Land Conservation Investment 
Variables Tobit  Truncated 
  Robust 
Coeff.  P-value Marginal  effect  Rob. coeff.  P-value 
     mfx
†  mfx
††    
Poverty-related factors 
Income 
Non-crop income  -.065  0.106 -.006  -.011  -.065  0.393 
Employment 
income  -.092* 0.061  -.008 -.015 -.067  0.564 
Cash-crop income  -.190*  0.014 -.016  -.031  -.356*  0.099 
Access to credit  -90.925*  0.055 -6.899  -14.102  88.052  0.310 
Non-liquid assets 
Farm size  34.326  0.344  2.914 5.512  182.178***  <  0.001 
No. of cattle  -3.222  0.753 -.274  -.517  34.510  0.109 
No. of ruminants  -3.903  0.619 -.331  -.627 .242  0.985 
Value of livestock  .0106  0.656 .001 .002  -.083*  0.076 
Value of trees  .010**  0.029  .001 .002  .017*** 0.008 
Value of crop 
produced  .020 0.299  .002 .003 -.031  0.345 
Human capital 
Male adults per 
hectare  10.950 0.322  .930  1.759 17.229  0.338 
Female adults per 
hectare  -.927 0.933  -.079 -.149 40.623**  0.055 
Ratio of 
dependents  -42.131 0.244  -3.576 -6.766 -2.977  0.968 
Age of household 
head  -.604 0.727 -.0513  -.097 2.159  0.425 
Sex of household 
head  39.194 0.560  3.129 6.176 34.205  0.792 
Literacy of 
household head  -20.329 0.641  -1.728 -3.266 -49.684  0.587 
Marital status of 
household head  -56.017 0.385  -5.194 -9.245 -168.634  0.187 
Access to 
extension advice  104.314** 0.039  8.882  16.752 -122.539  0.238 
Soil conservation 
advice  15.437 0.767  1.321 2.485 219.659**  0.031 
Life improvements  51.703**  0.027  4.389  8.303  -48.730  0.302 Environment for Development  Bekele and Mekonnen 
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Household 
expenditure  -.045**  0.035  -.004  -.007  .044  0.397 
Risk factors (land tenure security) 
Will cultivate plot 
for next 5 years  64.183 0.118  5.185  10.148 181.647**  0.020 
Land ownership 
type  71.912* 0.083  5.572 11.227 -53.803  0.551 
Land ownership 
belief  20.550 0.596  1.753 3.305 -169.240**  0.029 
Plot-to-residence 
distance  7.397* 0.097  .628  1.188 14.083**  0.039 
Simpson index  67.849  0.620  5.759 10.895  -29.803  0.917 





.648 0.213  .055 .104 -1.519  0.206 
Residence-to-




-.193 0.684  -.016 -.031 1.877**  0.043 
Return from 
investment  -181.891*** <  0.001  -14.363  -28.491 -249.305***  0.005 
Physical incentives 
Plot characteristics             
Highland -250.181***  0.003  -18.182 -38.123 -12.605  0.881 
Plot fertility  5.187  0.809  .440 .833  87.922* 0.086 
Plot slope  147.803**  0.030  16.436 25.857 77.540  0.419 
Plot access  109.043*  0.084  9.256 17.511  -2838.395***  <  0.001 
Access to 
irrigation  53.336 0.418  5.005 8.837 199.333  0.112 
Major use of plot 
Tree planting  -159.084***  0.004  -10.092 -23.384  75.330  0.455 





-9.173*** <  0.001  -.777 -1.475 -.213  0.916 
Modern fertilizer 
use  .583 0.356  .050 .094 1.512  0.390 
Natural fertilizer 
use  .072*** 0.005  .006  .012 .016  0.786 Environment for Development  Bekele and Mekonnen 
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Constant  .583  0.356      -219.803  0.491 
No. of observations  6,408  (uncensored = 1,005 
and left-censored = 5,403 
1,005 (5,403 truncated at 0) 
Log likelihood intercept  
only/fully 
-9436.072/-8832.3405 ----/-6327.9011 
Wald chi2(48)/P-value     259.07/0.0000  269.89/0.0000 
McFadden’s R-squared  0.064   
σ
†††/P-value  444.8358/0.000 342.05/0.000 
Notes:  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on household id in both the Tobit and truncated estimations.  
Site dummies are included but not reported here. 
 † The marginal effects for the unconditional expected value of the dependent variable, E(y*), are “mfx compute, 
predict(ys(a,b)),” where y* = max(a, min(y,b)); a (0 in our case) is the lower limit for left censoring; and b(. in our case) is the 
upper limit for right censoring. 
 †† The marginal effects for the expected value of the dependent variable conditional on being uncensored, E(y|a<y<b), are “mfx 
compute, predict(e(a,b)).” 
 
††† σ represents the ancillary statistic/sigma and is the estimated standard error of the regression. 
 
 